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Footnotes
1. In addition, in another 2016 decision, R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31,
2016 CarswellBC 1999 (Can.), the Supreme Court decided to
“restate” the constitutional formulation it had developed in R. v.
Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 (Can.), in relation to
section 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Con-
stitution Act, 1982 (“Any person charged with an offence has the
right . . . if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for
the offence has been varied between the time of commission and
the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment.”). 
2. See R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, 2016 CarswellBC 1864 (Can.).
3. 2016 SCC 22, 2016 CarswellBC 1552 (Can.), decided June 9,
2016.
4. Id. ¶ 19.
5. 2016 SCC 11, 2016 CarswellAlta 502 (Can.), decided March 24,
2016.
6. Id. ¶ 35.
7. Id. ¶ 13.
It is not every year that the Supreme Court of Canadareverses itself. However, as will be seen, this year it did.1
In this column I am going to review the decisions rendered
by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2016 that involve criminal
matters. The decisions are reviewed based on categories.
In 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada considered a multi-
tude of issues involving criminal law, including defences, evi-
dence, and sentencing. The Court also considered the applica-
tion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, to various criminal-law provisions and proce-
dures. Interestingly, the Supreme Court reversed itself and set
new guidelines for the right to be “tried within a reasonable
time,” as guaranteed by section 11(b) of the Charter.2
Let us start with the Supreme Court’s consideration in 2016
of criminal offences.
OFFENCES
BESTIALITY
Section 160 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985,
sets out the offence of bestiality. However, it does not define
the elements of the offence. 
In R. v. D.L.W.,3 the Supreme Court concluded that the
offence of bestiality requires proof of penetration. The Court
held that the offence requires proof of “sexual intercourse
between a human and an animal”:
The term “bestiality” has a well-established legal mean-
ing and refers to sexual intercourse between a human
and an animal. Penetration has always been understood
to be an essential element of bestiality. Parliament
adopted that term without adding a definition of it and
the legislative history and evolution of the relevant pro-
visions show no intent to depart from the well-under-
stood legal meaning of the term. Moreover, the courts
should not, by development of the common law,
broaden the scope of liability for this offence, as the trial
judge did. Any expansion of criminal liability for this
offence is within Parliament’s exclusive domain. In
short, this case falls within Stephen’s first category: our
Code assumes the continuing existence of the common
law definition of this crime.4
INFANTICIDE
Section 233 of the Criminal Code defines the offence of
infanticide. The section refers to a requirement that the mind
of a mother who kills her newly born child be “disturbed.” 
In R. v. Borowiec,5 the Supreme Court held that the word
“disturbed” in section 233 means “mentally agitated,” “men-
tally unstable,” or “mental discomposure.”6 The Court
described the nature of the offence in the following manner:
Infanticide, which is defined in s. 233 of the Crimi-
nal Code, is a form of culpable homicide and applies in
the narrow set of circumstances where (1) a mother, by
a wilful act or omission, kills her newborn child (under
one year of age, as defined by the Criminal Code, s. 2)
and, (2) at the time of the act or omission, the mother’s
mind is “disturbed” either because she is not fully
recovered from the effects of giving birth or by reason of
the effect of lactation: B. (L.), [2011 ONCA 153,] at
para. 58.7
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8. Id. ¶ 35.
9. 2016 SCC 10, 2016 CarswellAlta 504 (Can.), decided March 23,
2016.
10. Id. ¶ 1 [quoting the Court of Appeal’s decision, R. v. Alcantara,
2015 ABCA 258, 2015 CarswellAlta 1475, ¶ 15 (Can. Alta.)].
11. 2016 SCC 5, 2016 CarswellAlta 78 (Can.), decided January 22,
2016.
12. 2000 SCC 22, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520 (Can.).
13. Meer, 2016 SCC 5, ¶ 2.
14. 2016 SCC 14, 2016 CarswellOnt 5652 (Can.), decided April 15,
2016.
15. Id. ¶ 22.
16. 2016 SCC 43, decided October 21, 2016.
17. In Canada, a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment can be
served in a provincial institution rather than a federal institution. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the disturbance “must
be present at the time of the act or omission causing the
‘newly-born’ child’s death and the act or omission must occur
at a time when the accused is not fully recovered from the
effects of giving birth or of lactation.”8
PARTIES TO AN OFFENCE: AIDING AND ABETTING
Section 21(1) of the Criminal Code makes a person a party
to an offence if they aide or abet another person in committing
an offence. 
In R. v. Knapczyk,9 the Supreme Court adopted as correct
the following comments made by the Alberta Court of
Appeal:
On the correct application of the legal principles to the
facts found by the trial judge, it is an inescapable con-
clusion that the respondents aided and abetted the
offence of trafficking through distribution. Their acts
prevented or hindered interference with the accomplish-
ment of a criminal act. In this way, the respondents pro-
vided assistance and encouragement to Mr. Caines in the
commission of the offence of trafficking. There is a clear
link between the respondents’ acts and the commission
of the offence.10
PROCEDURE
COMPETENCY OF COUNSEL
In R. v. Meer,11 the Supreme Court reiterated the test it had
set out in R. v. G.D.B.12 for the setting aside of a conviction
based upon alleged incompetence of defence counsel: “To suc-
ceed in setting aside a trial verdict on the basis of the ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, the appellant must show ‘first, that
counsel’s acts or omissions constituted incompetence and sec-
ond, that a miscarriage of justice resulted.’”13
SENTENCING
PRE-SENTENCE CUSTODY
Section 719(3) of the Criminal Code allows a sentencing
judge to “take in account” (or “credit”) an offender for any
time spent by the offender in pre-sentence custody. However,
section 719(3.1) prohibits a sentencing judge from providing a
credit for pre-sentence custody greater than one day for each
day in pre-sentence custody if the offender was in custody
because bail was denied “primarily because of a previous con-
viction of the accused.”
In R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali,14 the Supreme Court held that
this provision violated section 7 of the Charter [the “right to
life, liberty and security . . . in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice”] because it was overbroad:
I conclude that the portion of the Truth in Sentencing Act
challenged in this appeal—the denial of any enhanced
credit for pre-sentence custody to persons to whom bail
is denied primarily because of a prior conviction—vio-
lates s. 7 of the Charter for another reason: it is over-
broad. Laws that curtail liberty in a way that is arbitrary,
overbroad or grossly disproportionate do not conform to
the principles of fundamental justice: Bedford v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101
(S.C.C.), at para. 105. Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali con-
tends that the challenged provision violates all three of
these principles. For the reasons that follow, I conclude
that the challenged law is unconstitutionally overbroad,
because its effect is to deprive some persons of liberty for
reasons unrelated to its purpose. This conclusion makes
it unnecessary to address whether the law is arbitrary or
grossly disproportionate.15
JOINT SUBMISSIONS
In R. v. Anthony-Cook,16 the Supreme Court of Canada con-
sidered joint submissions.  In this case the accused pleaded
guilty to the offence of manslaughter. Counsel presented a
joint submission seeking the imposition of a period of 18
months’ imprisonment. The trial judge rejected the submission
and imposed a period of two years’, less a day, imprisonment,
followed by three years of probation.17 The accused appealed.
His appeal was dismissed by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and imposed a
period of 18 months’ imprisonment. It set aside the probation
order. The Supreme Court concluded that the sentence jointly
submitted should have been imposed.  
The Court held that, in assessing a joint submission, a
Canadian sentencing judge must adopt a “public interest test.”
The Court described the test in the following manner:
Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not
depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the
proposed sentence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the
public interest. But, what does this threshold mean? Two
decisions from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court
of Appeal are helpful in this regard.
In Druken, at para. 29, the court held that a joint sub-
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18. 2016 SCC 43, ¶¶ 32-34.
19. 2016 SCC 32, 2016 CarswellNat 3179 (Can.), decided July 22,
2016.
20. Id. ¶ 24.
21. Id. ¶ 27.
22. Id. ¶ 33.
23. Id. ¶ 32.
24. 2016 SCC 24, 2016 CarswellAlta 1145 (Can.), decided June 23,
2016.
25. Id. ¶ 6.
mission will bring the administration of justice into dis-
repute or be contrary to the public interest if, despite the
public interest considerations that support imposing it,
it is so “markedly out of line with the expectations of
reasonable persons aware of the circumstances of the
case that they would view it as a break down in the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system”.  And,
as stated by the same court in R. v. B.O.2, 2010 NLCA 19
(CanLII), at para. 56, when assessing a joint submission,
trial judges should “avoid rendering a decision that
causes an informed and reasonable public to lose confi-
dence in the institution of the courts”.
In my view, these powerful statements capture the
essence of the public interest test developed by the Mar-
tin Committee. They emphasize that a joint submission
should not be rejected lightly, a conclusion with which I
agree.  Rejection denotes a submission so unhinged from
the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its
acceptance would lead reasonable and informed per-
sons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including
the importance of promoting certainty in resolution dis-
cussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the
justice system had broken down.18
THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
SECTION 7
Section 7 of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.”
In R. v. Cawthorne,19 a member of the Canadian Armed
Forces was charged with an offence. He was acquitted, and the
Minister of National Defence, as authorized by the National
Defence Act, launched an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada. The accused applied to quash the appeal, arguing that
the principles of fundamental justice were breached on the
basis that the Minister being a member of the Cabinet was not
independent from political influence in making prosecutorial
decisions. 
The Supreme Court held that “a prosecutor—whether it be
an Attorney General, a Crown prosecutor, or some other pub-
lic official exercising a prosecutorial function—has a constitu-
tional obligation to act independently of partisan concerns and
other improper motives.”20 However, the Court stated that
“partisan” is not “broadly synonymous with ‘political.’”21
The Court concluded that Parliament’s “conferral of author-
ity over appeals in the military justice system on the Minister
does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.”22 The Supreme Court indi-
cated that the Minister of Defence, “like the Attorney General
or other public officials with a prosecutorial function, is enti-
tled to a strong presumption that he exercises prosecutorial
discretion independently of partisan concerns. The mere fact
of the Minister’s membership in Cabinet does not displace that
presumption.”23
SECTION 8
Section 8 of the Charter prohibits “unreasonable” searches
or seizures. 
In R. v. Saeed,24 the Supreme Court held that the taking of a
penile swab from a suspect did not violate section 8 of the
Charter because it constituted a valid search incidental to
arrest, and, thus, any DNA evidence obtained from the swab-
bing was admissible:
[W]hile a penile swab constitutes a significant intrusion
on the privacy interests of the accused, the police may
nonetheless take a swab incident to arrest if they have
reasonable grounds to believe that the search will reveal
and preserve evidence of the offence for which the
accused was arrested, and the swab is conducted in a
reasonable manner.25
However, the Supreme Court set out “a number of factors to
guide police in conducting penile swabs incident to arrest rea-
sonably”:
1. The penile swab should, as a general rule, be con-
ducted at the police station; 
2. The swab should be conducted in a manner that
ensures the health and safety of all involved;
3. The swab should be authorized by a police officer act-
ing in a supervisory capacity;
4. The accused should be informed shortly before the
swab of the nature of the procedure for taking the
swab, the purpose of taking the swab, and the author-
ity of the police to require the swab; 
5. The accused should be given the option of removing
his clothing and taking the swab himself, and if he
does not choose this option, the swab should be
taken or directed by a trained officer or medical pro-
fessional, with the minimum of force necessary; 
6. The police officer(s) carrying out the penile swab
should be of the same gender as the individual being
swabbed, unless the circumstances compel other-
wise;
7. There should be no more police officers involved in
the swab than are reasonably necessary in the cir-
cumstances;
8. The swab should be carried out in a private area such
that no one other than the individuals engaged in the
swab can observe it; 
9. The swab should be conducted as quickly as possible
and in a way that ensures that the person is not com-
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In R. v. Jordan,32 the accused was charged with an offence
in December 2008. His trial ended in February 2013. He
applied for a stay of proceedings to be entered pursuant to
section 11(b) of the Charter due to the delay. 
The Supreme Court entered a stay of proceedings. In
doing so, the Court indicated that it was rejecting the frame-
work for section 11(b) that it had set out in R. v. Morin33 (a
balancing of factors). In its place, the Supreme Court created
a new framework, which involves “a presumptive ceiling”
beyond which delay from the date of the laying of the charge
to the actual or anticipated end of the trial will be “presumed
to be unreasonable,” unless “exceptional circumstances” jus-
tify the time period involved. The Court held that the pre-
sumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial
court and 30 months for cases tried in the superior court (or
cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary
inquiry). Delay attributable to or waived by the accused will
not count towards the presumptive ceiling.34
In R. v. Williamson,35 the accused was charged with a sex-
ual offence in January 2009. His trial ended in December
2011. Applying the new framework it set out in Jordan, the
Supreme Court entered a stay of proceedings. It held that
“although this is a close case, the transitional exceptional cir-
cumstance does not apply and, therefore, the delay is unrea-
sonable.”36
In R. v. Vassel,37 the accused was jointly charged with six
other individuals. It took over three years to proceed to trial.
The accused applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his
right to be tried within a reasonable period of time as protected
by section 11(b) of the Charter was breached. The Supreme
Court entered a stay of proceedings. It held that “a more proac-
tive stance on the Crown’s part was required”:
In fulfilling its obligation to bring all accused to trial
within a reasonable time, the Crown cannot close its
eyes to the circumstances of an accused who has done
everything possible to move the matter along, only to be
held hostage by his or her co-accused and the inability
of the system to provide earlier dates. That, unfortu-
nately, is what occurred here.38
SECTION 12
Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
prohibits “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” 
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pletely undressed at any one time; and 
10. A proper record should be kept of the reasons for
and the manner in which the swabbing was con-
ducted.26
SECTION 11(I)
Section 11(i) of the Charter states that if the punishment for
an offence is varied after a person commits an offence but
before sentencing, the person is entitled to “the benefit of the
lesser punishment.” 
In R. v. K.R.J.,27 the Supreme Court considered whether pro-
visions in the Criminal Code that allow a judge to prohibit an
offender who committed a sexual offence from having contact
with young persons (section 161(1)(c)) or using the Internet
(section 161(1)(d)) applied to sentencing for an offence com-
mitted before their enactment. The Court decided to “restate”
the definition of “punishment” it had formulated in R. v.
Rodgers28:
Thus, I would restate the test for punishment as fol-
lows in order to carve out a clearer and more meaning-
ful role for the consideration of the impact of a sanction:
a measure constitutes punishment if (1) it is a conse-
quence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of
sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect
of a particular offence, and either (2) it is imposed in
furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing,
or (3) it has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty
or security interests.29
The Supreme Court held that both provisions violated sec-
tion 11(i) of the Charter because they “are a consequence of
conviction, imposed in furtherance of the purpose and princi-
ples of sentencing, and they can have a significant impact on
the liberty and security of offenders.”30 However, the Court
found section 161(1)(d) to be constitutional because it consti-
tuted a reasonable limit “prescribed by law” that “can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” in
compliance with section one of the Charter.31
SECTION 11(B)
Section 11(b) of the Charter indicates that any “person
charged with an offence has the right . . . to be tried within a
reasonable time.” 
26. Id. ¶ 78; see Don Stuart, Saeed: A Pragmatic, Limited Police Power
to Take Penile Swabs Without a Warrant, 29 CRIM. REP. (7th) 51
(2016).
27. 2016 SCC 31, 2016 CarswellBC 1999 (Can.), decided July 21,
2016.
28. 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 (Can.).
29. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, ¶ 41. It is interesting to compare this deci-
sion with Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2476 (2016). In Welch,
the Supreme Court of the United States, in considering whether
constitutional decisions applied on a retroactive basis, adopted an
approach based on procedural versus substantive decisions. 
30. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, ¶ 57.
31. Section one of the Charter indicates that it “guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out” subject to “such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”  
32. 2016 SCC 27, 2016 CarswellBC 1864 (Can.), decided July 8,
2016.
33. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (Can.).
34. See Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, ¶ 105.
35. 2016 SCC 28, 2016 CarswellOnt 10704 (Can.), decided July 8,
2016.
36. See id. ¶ 25-30.
37. 2016 SCC 26, 2016 CarswellAlta 1213 (Can.), decided June 30,
2016.
38. Id. ¶ 7.
In R. v. Lloyd,39 the accused was convicted of the offence of
possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of traf-
ficking. Because of a prior conviction for a similar offence, he
was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of one year of
imprisonment, pursuant to section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Con-
trolled Drugs and Substances Act.
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded the mandatory
minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment violated sec-
tion 12 of the Charter on the basis that it “‘casts its net over a
wide range of potential conduct’. . . . As a result, it catches
not only the serious drug trafficking that is its proper aim, but
conduct that is much less blameworthy. This renders it consti-
tutionally vulnerable.”40
DEFENCES
ALIBI
In R. v. Laliberté,41 the Supreme Court held  that when the
defence of alibi is raised, a trial judge “must specify” in her or
his instruction to the jury that “the fabrication of an alibi sup-
ports an inference of consciousness of guilt, but no more than
that.”42 The Court also held that there must be other evidence
“independent of the finding that the alibi is false on the basis
of which a reasonable jury could conclude that the alibi was
deliberately fabricated and that the accused was involved in
that attempt to mislead the jury.”43
EVIDENCE
ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION OF A
THIRD PARTY
In World Bank Group v. Wallace,44 the accused were charged
with the offence of bribing foreign public officials. The accused
sought access to records in the possession of investigators of
the World Bank. The Supreme Court dismissed the applica-
tion, holding that “[t]he World Bank Group’s immunities cover
the records sought and its personnel, and they have not been
waived. Moreover, the records [of an independent unit within
the World Bank Group] were not disclosable under Canadian
law.”45
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In R. v. Villaroman,46 the Supreme Court considered the law
in relation to circumstantial evidence. 
The Supreme Court held that in “assessing circumstantial
evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to
arise from proven facts . . . . Requiring proven facts to sup-
port explanations other than guilt wrongly puts an obligation
on an accused to prove facts and is contrary to the rule that
whether there is a reasonable doubt is assessed by considering
all of the evidence. The issue with respect to circumstantial
evidence is the range of reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it. If there are reasonable inferences other than
guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”47
The Court held when a trial judge assesses circumstantial
evidence, she or he must consider “‘other plausible theor[ies]’
. . . inconsistent with guilt”:
When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of
fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and
“other reasonable possibilities” which are inconsistent
with guilt . . . . I agree with the appellant that the
Crown thus may need to negative these reasonable pos-
sibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every
possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful,
which might be consistent with the innocence of the
accused”: R. v. Bagshaw (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.),
at p. 8. “Other plausible theories” or “other reasonable
possibilities” must be based on logic and experience
applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not
on speculation.48
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
a number of issues in 2016 related to criminal law and proce-
dure. This included the defence of alibi (R. v. Laliberté) and
parties to an offence (R. v. Knapczyk). 
In the realm of offences, the Supreme Court considered the
offences of bestiality (R. v. D.L.W.) and infanticide (R. v.
Borowiec).
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39. 2016 SCC 13, 2016 CarswellBC 959 (Can.), decided April 15,
2016.
40. Id. ¶ 27.
41. 2016 SCC 17, 2016 CarswellQue 3436 (Can.), decided May 3,
2016.
42. Id. ¶ 3.
43. Id. ¶ 4.
44. 2016 SCC 15, 2016 CarswellOnt 6580 (Can.), decided April 29,
2016.
45. Id. ¶ 148.
46. 2016 SCC 33, 2016 CarswellAlta 1411 (Can.), decided July 29,
2016.
47. Id. ¶ 35.
48. Id. ¶ 37. In The Queen v. Baden-Clay, [2016] HCA 35 (Austl.),
decided August 31, 2016, the High Court of Australia considered
a similar issue. It explained its view of the difference between a
“reasonable inference” and “conjecture” in the following manner
(at paragraph 47):
For an inference to be reasonable, it “must rest upon
something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility
of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding the
prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only infer-
ence open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all
the facts in evidence” (emphasis added). Further, “in con-
sidering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances
established by the evidence are to be considered and
weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consis-
tent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence”
(emphasis added). The evidence is not to be looked at in a
piecemeal fashion, at trial or on appeal. 
In the constitutional context, the Court declared a mini-
mum mandatory sentence unconstitutional (R. v. Lloyd) and
considered the role of the prosecutor (R. v. Cawthorne).
Finally, it is difficult to predict over the course of a year
which decision rendered by a Supreme Court will have the
most significant long-term effect. For the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2016, I would choose the Court’s decision in Jordan.
Not only did the Supreme Court take the exceptional step of
reversing itself, it set out a framework that might lead to many
criminal charges being stayed.49
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49. As of October 31, 2016, in applying Jordan, stays of proceedings
have been entered by Canadian trial judges in R. v. Huard, 2016
QCCA 1701 (Can. Que.); R. v. Boisvert, 2016 QCCQ 11068, 2016
CarswellQue 9973 (Can. Que.); R. v. Keller, 2016 SKQB 319, 2016
CarswellSask 641 (Can. Sask.); R. v. Reynolds, 2016 ONCJ 606,
2016 CarswellOnt 16239 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Sachro, 2016 ONCJ
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son, 2016 NSSC 192, 2016 CarswellNC 626 (Can. N.S.); R. v.
Korzh, 2016 ONSC 4745, 2016 CarswellOnt 11986 (Can. Ont.);
R. v. Zammit, 2016 ONSC 5098, 2016 CarswellOnt 12711 (Can.
Ont.); R. v. Edan, 2016 ONCJ 493, 2016 CarswellOnt 12953 (Can.
Ont.); R. v. Dunphy, 2016 NSSC 224, 2016 CarswellNS 722 (Can.
N.S.), R. v. Tran, 2016 ONCJ 528, 2016 CarswellOnt 13730 (Can.
Ont.); R. v. Lam, 2016 ABQB 489, 2016 CarswellAlta 1647 (Can.
Alta.); R. v. Beausoleil, 2016 QCCQ 8914, 2016 CarswellQue 8182
(Can. Que.). They have been refused in R. v. Smythe, 2016 ONCJ
620, 2016 CarswellOnt 16467 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Park, 2016 SKPC
137, 2016 CarswellSask 664 (Can. Sask.); R. v. Ramsay, 2016
ONCJ 569, 2016 CarswellOnt 14580; R. v. Kopalasingam, 2016
ONCJ 486, 2016 CarswellOnt 12682 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Swami-
nathan, 2016 ONSC 4913, 2016 CarswellOnt 12558 (Can. Ont.);
R. v. Gandhi, 2016 ONSC 5612, 2016 CarswellOnt 13863 (Can.
Ont.); R. v. Fauolo, 2016 ABPC 192, 2016 CarswellAlta 1674
(Can. Alta.); R. v. Da Silva, 2016 ONCJ 480, 2016 CarswellOnt
12578 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Kennedy, 2016 ONSC 4654, 2016 Car-
swellOnt 13204 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Howe, 2016 NSSC 184, 2016
CarswellNS 618 (Can. N.S.); R. v. Ly, 2016 ONCJ 545, 2016 Car-
swellOnt 13928 (Can. Ont.); and R. v. Curry, 2016 BCSC 1435,
2016 CarswellBC 2152 (Can. B.C.).
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